












School of Law 
 
 
This is a pre-copy edited, author-produced PDF of an article accepted for 
publication in the Journal of International Criminal Justice following peer 
review.  
 
The definitive publisher-authenticated version of Roscini, Marco (2007) Great 
expectations: the implementation of the Rome Statute in Italy. Journal of 
International Criminal Justice, 5 (2). pp. 493-512. ISSN 1478-138 is available 





The WestminsterResearch online digital archive at the University of 
Westminster aims to make the research output of the University available to a 
wider audience.  Copyright and Moral Rights remain with the authors and/or 
copyright owners. 
Users are permitted to download and/or print one copy for non-commercial 
private study or research.  Further distribution and any use of material from 
within this archive for profit-making enterprises or for commercial gain is 




Whilst further distribution of specific materials from within this archive is forbidden, 




In case of abuse or copyright appearing without permission e-mail 
repository@westminster.ac.uk 
Great Expectations: the Implementation of the Rome Statute in 
Italy 
Marco Roscini 
Mere dreams, mere dreams! 
W.B. Yeats, Meditations in Time of Civil War, I (1928) 
 
Please note: this is an unproofed version  






The article first explores whether Italy is under an obligation to implement the Rome 
Statute that it ratified in 1999. It can be maintained that such an obligation is 
provided both by national and international law. The article then identifies the 
general sets of inconsistencies between Italian legislation and the Rome Statute and 
analyses whether and to what extent the former needs to be amended or integrated in 
order to implement the substantive provisions of the latter, in particular in relation to 
the definition of crimes, general principles of criminal responsibility, defences and 
other bars to prosecution. Finally, the exercise of jurisdiction by Italian courts over 
the International Criminal Court (ICC) crimes is discussed, in the light of the 
principle of complementarity on which the jurisdiction of the ICC is based.                                                 
1. Introduction 
Under the dualist approach to the relationship between international and municipal 
law, the adoption of legislation is necessary for a treaty to produce its effects in the 
domestic legal order. In Italy, such legislation may assume one of two possible forms. 
It could consist of a law simply containing one or two provisions ordering the 
domestic execution of the treaty, the text of which is usually annexed and which will 
be applied untransformed (ordine di esecuzione); or it could be a law which interprets 
and reformulates the provisions of the treaty and amends existing legislation, if this is 
necessary to implement them. The first method is the one usually preferred by the 
Italian Parliament and it has been employed also in the case of the Rome Statute.1 
However, the ordine di esecuzione is an adequate way of implementing a treaty in the 
domestic legal order only to the extent that treaty norms are self-executing. To the 
extent that they are not, additional implementing legislation needs to be formulated 
and adopted.2 
                                           
 Visiting Lecturer, Queen Mary University of London; Research Fellow, University of Verona. The 
article is a revised version of a paper prepared for the International Secretariat of Amnesty International 
and is based on developments as of September 2005. I would like to thank Christopher Keith Hall, 
Stefano Manacorda, Antonio Marchesi and Attila Tanzi for their helpful comments. All errors remain 
mine and the views expressed do not necessarily reflect those of Amnesty International. 
1 Law No. 232 of 12 July 1999. 
2 T. Treves, Diritto internazionale. Problemi fondamentali (Milano: Giuffrè, 2005), 700-703. 
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The Rome Statute is largely non self-executing: it does not provide for penalties 
and requires states parties to establish internal procedures for cooperation with the 
Court. Moreover, crimes under the Rome Statute must also be considered as crimes 
under the domestic law of the given state for them to be prosecuted before its national 
courts.3 Indeed, Italian courts and criminal lawyers have always supported the 
reformulation of international criminal rules in domestic provisions in order to include 
crimes and specify penalties. The prevailing view is that, in the absence of such 
reformulation and even if the state had ratified a convention and ordered its domestic 
execution, its provisions could not be directly enforced before national courts without 
violating the principle of legality of crimes and penalties and the cognate principles of 
specificity, certainty, foreseeability and accessibility.4 
However, the evaluation of the self-executing character of treaty provisions 
should be made by also taking into account the characteristics of the national legal 
order into which they have been transposed. Indeed, if domestic law were already 
consistent with the Rome Statute and provided for an equivalent regime, if penalties 
were identifiable and if suitable cooperation procedures were already available at the 
national level, there would be no need to adopt ad hoc legislation.5 Hence, this article 
explores whether and to what extent the existing Italian legislation needs to be 
amended or integrated in order to fully and effectively implement the Rome Statute.6 
Section 2 discusses whether Italy is under an obligation to implement the Rome 
Statute in the national legal order, while Section 3 analyses the general sets of 
problems with regard to the implementation process and proposes possible solutions. 
The comparative part (Sections 4 and 5) addresses crimes, general principles of 
criminal responsibility, defences and other bars to prosecution, and Section 5 
discusses the jurisdiction of Italian courts over those responsible for crimes under the 
Rome Statute in the light of the principle of complementarity. 
2. Italy’s Obligation to Implement the Rome Statute 
A big question mark remains as to whether the relevant Italian organs would be under 
an obligation to adopt further legislation implementing non self-executing provisions 
of the Rome Statute.7 In the national legal order, it is the present author’s view that 
such an obligation derives from the new wording of Article 117 (1) of the Italian 
                                           
3 S. Manacorda, ‘L’armonizzazione dei sistemi penali: una introduzione’, in Centro nazionale di 
prevenzione e difesa sociale, La giustizia penale italiana nella prospettiva internazionale (Milano: 
Giuffrè, 2000), 35-74, at 51. 
4 See F. Antolisei, Manuale di diritto penale, Parte generale (Milano: Giuffrè, 2003), 77; B. Conforti, 
Diritto internazionale (Napoli: Editoriale Scientifica, 2002), 307; M. Pisani, ‘La “penetrazione” del 
diritto internazionale penale nel diritto penale italiano’, 13 Indice penale (1979), 5-30, at 8; R. Riz, 
Lineamenti di diritto penale. Parte generale (Milano: Giuffrè, 2001), 34-36. 
5 G. Werle and S. Manacorda, ‘L’adaptation des systèmes pénaux nationaux au Statut de Rome: le 
paradigme du ‘Völkerstrafgesetzbuch’ allemand’, 58 Revue de science criminelle et de droit pénal 
comparé (2003), 501-515, at 508. According to the Italian Court of Cassation, even in the absence of  
further implementing legislation, the ordine di esecuzione might be sufficient if suitable provisions are 
already present in the national legislation (Cassazione civile (Sezioni Unite), 27 June 1952, No. 1908, 
76 Foro italiano (1953), Parte Prima, 22-28). 
6 This article will focus on the substantive provisions of the Rome Statute, although occasional 
references to cooperation obligations will be made. 
7 As of December 2005, Italy has not yet enacted such legislation. For the draft implementing 
legislation submitted by some members of the Parliament and for the commissions established by 
several ministers to study the topic and prepare drafts, see R. Bellelli, ‘Come adattare l’ordinamento 
giuridico italiano allo Statuto della Corte dell’Aja’, 10 Diritto penale e processo (2003), 1299-1304. 
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Constitution, which provides that the legislative powers of the state and of the regions 
shall be exercised consistently with, among others, international law. Not only does 
this norm imply the obligation not to enact legislation in contrast to treaties to which 
Italy is a party (negative meaning), but also to adopt all necessary steps to fully 
implement them (positive meaning).8 
Does Italy’s obligation to implement the Rome Statute also exist at the 
international level, i.e. towards other subjects of international law? As far as 
cooperation provisions are concerned, such an obligation is expressly spelt out in the 
Rome Statute. Article 88 provides that ‘States Parties shall ensure that there are 
procedures available under their national law for all of the forms of cooperation’ 
which are specified under Part 9 of the Statute. The same can be said about offences 
against the administration of justice: Article 70 (4) requires the parties to ‘extend their 
criminal laws penalizing offences against the integrity of its own investigative or 
judicial process to offences against the administration of justice referred to in this 
article, committed in its territory, or by one of its nationals’. 
As to the crimes contained in Articles 6, 7 and 8 of the Rome Statute, the Statute 
contains no express obligation for states parties to transpose those provisions into 
domestic law. However, at least for certain crimes, such an obligation can be inferred 
from other sources. In the Furundžija case, the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
former Yugoslavia (ICTY) has argued that normally ‘failure to pass the required 
implementing legislation has only a potential effect: the wrongful fact occurs only 
when administrative or judicial measures are taken which, being contrary to 
international rules due to the lack of implementing legislation, generate state 
responsibility’.9 In the case of torture, however, the ICTY stated that ‘the requirement 
that states expeditiously institute national implementing measures is an integral part of 
the international obligation to prohibit this practice’ and therefore ‘states must 
immediately set in motion all those procedures and measures that may make it 
possible, within their municipal legal system to forestall any act of torture or 
expeditiously put an end to any torture that is occurring’. It also added that ‘[t]he mere 
fact of keeping in force or passing legislation contrary to the international prohibition 
of torture generates international state responsibility’.10 The above reasoning is based 
on the assumption that the prohibition of torture ‘has evolved into a peremptory norm 
or jus cogens, that is, a norm that enjoys a higher rank in the international hierarchy 
than treaty law and even “ordinary” customary rules’.11 The case can well be made 
that the conclusions of the ICTY with regard to the crime of torture would also apply 
to other jus cogens provisions contained in the Rome Statute, such as that 
criminalizing genocide. 
With regard to the other crimes and to general principles of criminal 
responsibility, defences and other bars to prosecution (to the extent that the relevant 
provisions in the Rome Statute are not already self-executing), it is generally believed 
that customary international law does not provide for an obligation to enact legislation 
implementing a treaty that has been previously ratified. Indeed, states parties do not 
usually complain when the Parliaments of other parties do not enact such legislation 
                                           
8 See P. Ivaldi, ‘L’adattamento del diritto interno al diritto internazionale’, in S. Carbone, R. Luzzatto 
and A. Santa Maria (eds), Istituzioni di diritto internazionale (Torino: Giappichelli, 2003), 117-149, at 
122-123. Art. 117 of the Constitution has been amended by Constitutional Law No. 3 of 18 October 
2001, Art. 3. 
9 Judgment, Furundžija (IT-95-17/1), Trial Chamber II, 10 December 1998, para. 149. 
10 Ibid., paras. 149-150. 
11 Ibid., para. 153. 
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and they protest only against the actual breaches of conventional provisions regardless 
of what might have caused them.12 The only decisions that have upheld the existence 
of a general duty to implement a treaty into domestic law are those of the Permanent 
Court of International Justice in the Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations case 
(1925)13 and of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in the Garrido and 
Baigorria case of 1998.14 
Be that as it may, the obligation to ensure that crimes under the jurisdiction of 
the Court are also crimes under national law and that domestic principles of criminal 
responsibility are consistent with those contained in the Rome Statute must be 
considered as implicit, because the jurisdiction of the Court is based on the principle 
of complementarity.15 Indeed, if states parties failed to comply with this obligation, 
they would not be able to fulfil their primary duty to investigate and prosecute the 
crimes contained in the Statute and might be found ‘unable genuinely to carry out the 
investigation or prosecution’ within the meaning of Article 17 of the Rome Statute: 
the notion of ‘inability’ can well extend to the absence or inadequacies of domestic 
provisions.16 The Court could then exercise its complementary jurisdiction but would 
probably be overwhelmed with cases and would not be able to handle them all 
because of its limited financial and human resources. This result would be in marked 
contrast to the purpose of the Statute, which is to put an end to impunity for the 
perpetrators of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and, eventually, 
aggression and to contribute to the prevention of such crimes.17 States parties not 
fulfilling their responsibility to ensure that the Court is able to operate effectively 
would also breach the duty to perform treaties in good faith codified in Article 26 of 
the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. 
3. Inconsistencies Between the Italian Legislation and the Rome 
Statute 
Four general sets of situations can be identified with regard to the implementation of 
the substantive provisions of the Rome Statute (crimes, principles of criminal 
responsibility, defences) in the Italian legal order. First of all, Italian law is sometimes 
more restrictive than the Rome Statute: it provides for crimes that have not been 
included in the latter or defines them more broadly, and it contains some defences that 
are narrower than those permitted in the Rome Statute. Of course, this does not raise 
any problem: it is a sovereign prerogative of every state to enact whatever criminal 
laws it considers appropriate, consistently with international human rights standards. 
Moreover, the fact that Italy goes beyond its implementation obligations will not 
prevent it from fulfilling its primary duty to investigate and prosecute the crimes 
within the jurisdiction of the Court. 
                                           
12 A. Cassese, International Law (Oxford: OUP, 2001), 167. 
13 1924 Series B, No. 10, at 20. 
14 Judgment of 27 August 1998, Series C, No. 39, para. 68. The point has been reiterated in Durand and 
Ugarte, 16 August 2000, Series C, No. 68, para. 136; and in Baena Ricardo et al., 2 February 2001, 
Series C, No. 72, para. 179. 
15 H. Relva, ‘The Implementation of the Rome Statute in Latin American States’, 16 Leiden Journal of 
International Law (2003), at 337-338. 
16 J. K. Kleffner, ‘The Impact of Complementarity on National Implementation of Substantive 
International Criminal Law’, 1 Journal of International Criminal Justice (2003), 86-113, 89. 
17 Preamble, para. 5. According to Art. 31 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, a 
treaty must be interpreted, inter alia, in the light of its object and purpose. 
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Second, the crimes under the Rome Statute might be covered by Italian 
provisions sanctioning ‘ordinary’ domestic offences. Although national investigations 
or prosecutions on the basis of such offences instead of the specific international 
crimes included in the Rome Statute would not automatically make cases admissible 
before the Court, this situation is very likely to arise. Indeed, ordinary provisions 
would probably cover a narrower range of conduct than does the Rome Statute and 
the penalties would not adequately reflect the gravity of the crimes within the 
jurisdiction of the Court. Furthermore, even if the existing penalties were sufficiently 
severe, the prosecution would be subject to all restrictions (statutes of limitation, 
defences, extenuating circumstances, non-applicability of universal jurisdiction, etc.) 
relevant to ordinary offences. For these reasons, the state might well be found 
‘unwilling’ to genuinely carry out the investigation or prosecution if national 
proceedings based on ordinary offences were designed to shield the accused from 
criminal responsibility or were inconsistent with an intent to bring the person 
concerned to justice (Article 17 (2) of the Rome Statute). The state would also risk 
being deemed ‘otherwise unable to carry out its proceedings’ in the sense explained 
above (Article 17 (3)). In addition, Article 20 (3) of the Rome Statute provides that 
the ne bis in idem principle does not prevent the Court from exercising its jurisdiction 
when national proceedings were a sham intended to ensure impunity to the accused. 
Although not expressly provided in the Rome Statute, an obligation to reject the 
‘ordinary crimes approach’ might then result implicitly from Articles 17 and 20 (3), 
since the classification of conduct as an ordinary crime would considerably increase 
the number of admissible cases and an overburdened Court might lead to the impunity 
of perpetrators of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, in contrast to the 
purpose of the Statute and to the duty to perform treaties in good faith. 
Third, some Rome Statute provisions might be implemented through the mere 
reference, contained in a domestic provision, to international treaties to which Italy is 
a party. Article 185-bis of the Military Penal Code of War (MPCW) criminalizes, 
among others, ‘other inhuman treatment ... and other acts prohibited by international 
conventions’, and Articles 174 and 175 provide that a commander or other person 
who authorizes, orders or employs the use of methods and means of war prohibited by 
Italian law or international conventions incurs criminal responsibility. It is doubtful 
whether such provisions are consistent with the principle of legality of crimes, and in 
particular with the sub-principle according to which criminal rules must be as specific 
and as accurate as possible (nullum crimen sine lege stricta). Indeed, the unlawful 
conduct will have to be determined through an hermeneutic operation by the judge 
and it will be difficult to establish whether it was known or knowable by the accused. 
Furthermore, the different international law instruments which Italy has ratified may 
be inconsistent: for example, Article 8 (2) (b) (iv) of the Rome Statute prohibits a 
much narrower range of conduct than the corresponding provision in Additional 
Protocol I (Article 57 (2) (a) (iii)). Articles 174 and 175 do not make it sufficiently 
clear which international law instrument should be applied in such situation. Hence, to 
avoid such doubts, it would be advisable that every crime contained in the Rome 
Statute be specifically defined as a crime in domestic law. 
Finally, Italian law does not incorporate certain Rome Statute crimes and 
defines others more narrowly. The application of some domestic principles of 
criminal responsibility, defences and bars to prosecution might also lead to impunity 
in an Italian court on the same facts that would lead to a conviction in the 
International Criminal Court. As argued in Section 2, Italy is under an obligation both 
under international and constitutional law to incorporate all crimes and principles 
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contained in the Statute and to amend existing domestic provisions whenever they are 
less restrictive. In the following sections, lacunae and weak provisions of Italian law 
will be identified and discussed, making reference to the corresponding articles of the 
Rome Statute. 
4. Definitions of Crimes 
A. Genocide 
Law No. 962 of 9 October 1967, which implemented the 1948 Convention for the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, is largely consistent with 
Article 6 of the Rome Statute and Article II of the Genocide Convention, but is 
broader, since it criminalizes deportation and the obligation to wear distinguishing 
marks. Article 1 (2) of Law no. 962 is also broader than Article 6 (c) of the Rome 
Statute, since the infliction on the group of conditions of life calculated to bring about 
its physical destruction in whole or in part is not required to be ‘intentional’.18 
However, Article 1 of Law no. 962 does not fully implement Article II of the 
Genocide Convention and Article 6 (b) of the Rome Statute, since it does not include 
mental harm. Furthermore, Article 5 of Law no. 962 limits its scope to the transfer of 
children under age of 14 years, while neither Article II of the Genocide Convention 
nor Article 6 (e) of the Rome Statute contains such a limit, and in the Elements of 
Crimes the age limit is 18 years.  
Law no. 962 criminalizes acts which are committed not only by the principal 
offender, but also - as in Article III of the Genocide Convention - those committed by 
others in the form of complicity, conspiracy and attempt, as well as public incitement 
to commit genocide, whether or not the principal crime has been committed. Unlike 
Article III of the Genocide Convention, Article 8 of Law no. 962 also criminalizes 
public defence of genocide. 
Article 1 of Law no. 962 criminalizes acts which are only aimed at causing 
injuries or the death of members of the group. This provision advances the threshold 
of criminal responsibility well beyond the attempted crime (which, under Article 56 of 
the Penal Code, requires the conduct intended to commit an offence to be able 
(‘idoneo’) and unequivocal) and might include any act which is potentially aimed at 
genocide even if preliminary and not particularly harmful, such as the purchase of 
weapons. In contrast, Article 6 of the Rome Statute requires the killing, the causing 
serious bodily or mental harm, the infliction of certain conditions of life, the 
imposition of measures intended to prevent births and the forcible transfer of children 
to take place for criminal responsibility to arise. 
B. Crimes Against Humanity  
Crimes against humanity are not provided as such in Italy. Most crimes contained in 
Article 7 of the Rome Statute are partially covered by domestic criminal provisions: 
murder by Article 575 of the Penal Code, rape and other forms of sexual violence by 
Articles 609-bis et seq., enslavement by Articles 600, 601 and 602 (as amended by 
Law No. 228 of 11 August 2003), imprisonment or other severe deprivation of 
physical liberty in violation of fundamental rules of international law by Articles 605, 
                                           
18 N. Ronzitti, ‘Genocidio’, XVIII Enciclopedia del diritto (Milano: Giuffrè, 1969), at 587. 
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606 and 607, forced disappearances by Articles 606 and 607.19 Although the crime of 
enslavement, as defined in the new text of Article 600, is broader than the 
corresponding definition in Article 7,20 other definitions in the Code fall short of those 
included in the Rome Statute. In particular, the crime of forced disappearances only 
includes arrest and detention performed by public officials, and not also those 
committed with the authorization, support or acquiescence of a state or a political 
organization.  
Rape as an ordinary crime as well as other forms of sexual violence are covered 
by Articles 609-bis et seq. of the Penal Code. However, Article 609-bis does not fully 
appear to be consistent with the most recent international jurisprudence concerning 
the elements of this crime against humanity, because the definition of rape is based on 
the presence of violence, threats or abuse of authority rather than on the lack of 
consent of the victim.21 The crimes of sexual slavery and enforced prostitution are 
covered by the new text of Article 600 of the Penal Code. As to the other sexual 
crimes listed in Article 7 (1) (g) of the Rome Statute (forced pregnancy, enforced 
sterilisation), there are currently no corresponding provisions in the Penal Code or 
elsewhere. 
There is no provision in the Penal Code which provides for the crimes against 
humanity of apartheid,22 extermination, deportation and forcible transfer of 
population, torture, persecution and other inhuman acts. Some conduct amounting to 
torture, but presumably not all,23 could be covered by various provisions of the Penal 
Code, including Articles 581 (beating), 582-583 (bodily harm), 610 (criminal 
coercion), 606 (illegal arrest), 607 (unlawful restriction of personal freedom), 608 
(abuse of authority against people arrested or detained), 609 (arbitrary search and 
personal inspection), 612 (threatening) and 605 (kidnapping) of the Penal Code. 
However, such provisions do not adequately take into account the gravity the crime of 
torture, the mental element and the circumstances under which it is committed.24  
C. War Crimes 
Some war crimes in international armed conflicts contained in the Rome Statute are 
                                           
19 On these crimes, see A. Cassese, Crimes Against Humanity, in A. Cassese, P. Gaeta and J.R.W.D. 
Jones (eds), Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Commentary (Oxford: OUP, 2002), 
vol. I, 353-377; M. Boot, R. Dixon and C.K. Hall, Article 7 (Crimes Against Humanity), in O. Triffterer 
(ed),  Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: Observers’ Notes, Article 
by Article (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1999), 117-172. 
20 Apart from the exercise of the powers attaching to the right of ownership over a person, Art. 600 also 
forbids keeping someone in a state of continuing subjection by means of violence, threat, deception, 
abuse of authority or by taking advantage of a situation of physical or mental inferiority or of a state of 
necessity, or by means of promising or giving an amount of money or other advantages to those who 
have authority over the person. 
21 A. Cadoppi, ‘Article 3’, in A. Cadoppi (ed), Commentari delle norme contro la violenza sessuale e 
della legge contro la pedofilia (Padova: CEDAM, 2002), 27-143, at 125. See Prosecutor v. Kunarać  
(IT-96-23), Judgment, Appeals Chamber, ICTY, 12 June 2002, paras. 129-133. 
22 Italy has not ratified the 1973 Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of 
Apartheid. 
23 For example, psychological and moral torture is not covered (A. Marchesi, ‘L’attuazione in Italia 
degli obblighi internazionali di repressione della tortura’, 82 Rivista di diritto internazionale (1999), 
463-475, at 467-468). 
24 Committee Against Torture, Considerations of Reports Submitted by States Parties under Art. 19 of 
the Convention, Second periodic reports, 1994, Italy, UN Doc. A/50/44 No. 157. 
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already included in the MPCW.25 The war crime of enforced sterilization might be 
covered by Article 185-bis, which criminalizes torture or other inhuman treatment, 
unlawful transfers and other conduct prohibited by international conventions, 
including biological experiments or medical treatment not justified by the state of 
health. However, Article 185-bis puts together very different forms of conduct and 
serious questions can be raised about whether the penalty is adequate to the gravity of 
the crimes involved (from two to five years of military imprisonment).26 Be that as it 
may, this Article applies only when conduct does not constitute a more serious crime: 
conduct that could be qualified as ‘torture’ might, therefore, fall under the scope of 
provisions dealing with ordinary crimes, such as Article 582 of the Penal Code 
(bodily harm), Article 609-bis (sexual violence), Article 605 (kidnapping), since the 
penalties for these crimes are more severe. 
Other war crimes under Article 8 (2) (a) and (b) of the Rome Statute are 
included in Articles 35 and 36 of the pioneer Law of War of 1938, which also 
criminalizes the shooting of those wrecked at sea as the result of shipwreck or the 
destruction of aircraft (Article 35 (3) no. 3) and the use of explosive or incendiary 
weapons which weigh less than 400 grams (Article 35 (3) no. 5).27 As far as 
bacteriological and chemical weapons are concerned, Article 51 of the Law of War 
refers to the international provisions in force. When no rule of customary international 
law or treaty provision exists, or if the enemy is not a party to international treaties, 
such weapons are prohibited by way of reciprocity, providing that the enemy declares 
that it intends not to use them and does not actually use them (Article 52).  
Definitions of crimes in Italian legislation are occasionally broader than those in 
the Rome Statute. Articles 213 and 214 of the MPCW provide for the protection of 
the rights of prisoners of war to freedom of religion and worship, and also prohibits 
appropriation of their valuables.28 Article 212 provides that prisoners of war cannot be 
compelled to give information or to carry out prohibited works. Article 37 of the 1938 
Law of War prohibits compelling prisoners of war to participate in hostile actions 
against their own country, and also prohibits them being compelled to serve as guides 
or give information on military issues or in any other way.29 Furthermore, the Law of 
War defines the war crime of making improper use of the distinctive emblems of the 
Red Cross more broadly than Article 8 (2) (b) (vii) of the Rome Statute by also 
prohibiting improper use of the parliamentarian flag, the emblems of other 
humanitarian organizations, hospital ships and medical aircraft, and it also omits the 
restrictive requirement that improper use must result in death or serious personal 
injury to be a crime. 
In other cases, the relevant provisions of the MPCW are not as broad as the 
corresponding articles in the Rome Statute. For example, Article 185 of the MPCW 
provides that a member of the armed forces who uses violence, for reasons related to 
                                           
25 See, for instance, Articles 182, 184-bis, 185-bis, 186-188, 191, 193, 224 of the MPCW. 
26 If the person were sentenced to two years’ imprisonment, he or she might be accorded the benefit of 
the suspension of the sentence (A. Lanzi and T. Scovazzi, ‘Una dubbia repressione della tortura e di 
altri gravi crimini di guerra’, 87 Rivista di diritto internazionale (2004), 685-694, at 689-690). 
27 Royal Decree No. 1415 of 8 July 1938. 
28 The same provision is included in Art. 106 of the 1938 Law of War, which also prohibits the 
employment of prisoners of war in excessive works or works not suitable for their rank and provides 
their right to receive payment for such work and to keep their personal objects (with the exception of 
weapons, horses, equipment and military documents). Money and valuables can be temporarily 
appropriated under Art. 106. 
29 However, this provision does not apply to persons who have dual Italian-foreign nationality or to 
foreigners who have to perform their military service in Italy. 
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the war, against enemy private individuals who do not take part in military operations 
is criminally responsible, if he does so without necessity or justified reason.30 This is 
inconsistent with Article 8 (2) of the Rome Statute and with other international 
humanitarian law instruments which safeguard all protected persons involved in the 
armed conflict and not just the nationals of the enemy states. 31 The limited relevance 
of the nationality of protected persons was confirmed by the ICTY in the Tadić 
judgment of 15 July 1999.32 The reference to the ‘justified reason’ contained in 
Article 185 also weakens the protection. 
Finally, certain war crimes defined in Article 8 (2) (a) and (b) of the Rome 
Statute are still not defined as crimes in Italian law (such as those included in Article 
8 (2) (a) (vi) and (b) (iii), (vii), (xiv) and (xxvi)). Italy also omits rape and other 
sexual crimes as war crimes from the MPCW, which would result in the application of 
the relevant provisions of the Penal Code. 
 
War crimes in non-international armed conflicts. According to the new text of 
Article 165 (1) of the MPCW, as amended by Law No. 6 of 31 January 2002, Section 
IV of Chapter III of the MPCW now applies to all armed conflicts regardless of a 
declaration of war. In order to implement this provision, Law No. 15 of 27 February 
2002 introduced two new paragraphs to Article 165. The first paragraph defines an 
armed conflict as a conflict in which at least one of the parties uses weapons in an 
organized and protracted manner against the other party for the conduct of military 
operations. This definition does not appear in the Rome Statute, the Geneva 
Conventions or their Additional Protocols. According to the commentary to Article 2 
of the Geneva Conventions, an armed conflict is ‘tout différend surgissant entre deux 
Etats et provoquant l’intervention de membres des forces armées’, even when isolated 
and sporadic such as a border incident.33 Hence, at least as far as international armed 
conflicts are concerned, the definition contained in Article 165 (2) is more restrictive 
in scope, since it requires the use of weapons to be organized and protracted, while it 
might be consistent with the threshold provided in Article 1 (2) of Additional Protocol 
II and with Article 8 (2) (d) (f) of the Rome Statute with regard to non-international 
armed conflicts. 
However that may be, in the absence of a distinction between international and 
non-international armed conflict the crimes included in Section IV could be 
prosecuted even when committed in an armed conflict not of an international 
character. Accordingly, Italian legislation criminalizes conduct such as the improper 
use of a flag of truce or other distinctive emblems of the Geneva Conventions (Article 
180 of the MPCW) even when committed in a non-international armed conflict, while 
the Rome Statute only does it with regard to international conflicts. Nonetheless, 
some provisions contained in Section IV of Chapter III of the MPCW need to be 
amended, since according to their wording they seem to apply only to international 
                                           
30 G. Bartolini, ‘Le modifiche al codice penale militare di guerra a seguito della missione italiana in 
Afghanistan’, 57 La Comunità internazionale (2002), 171-199, at 192. Violence is defined in Art. 43 of 
the MPCP and includes murder, bodily harm, beating, ill-treatment and any attempts to do harm with 
weapons. 
31 See, e.g., Art. 4 (1) of the IV Geneva Convention. 
32 Judgment, Tadić (IT-94-1-A), Appeals Chamber, 15 July 1999, paras. 168-169. 
33 J. Pictet (ed), Les Conventions de Genève du 12 août 1949 - Commentaire (Geneva: CICR, 1952), 
vol. I, at 34. See also the ICTY decision on the defence motion for interlocutory appeal on jurisdiction 
in the Tadić case (‘an armed conflict exists whenever there is a resort to armed force between states or 
protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and organized armed groups or between 
such groups within a state’ (IT-94-1, Appeals Chamber, 2 October 1995, para. 70)). 
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armed conflicts. It is the case of Articles 185 and 187 (which implement Article 8 (2) 
(c) (i) and (e) (xii) of the Rome Statute, respectively), and Articles 177, 190 and 192 
of the MPCW, which all refer to ‘enemies’ and ‘enemy state’, terms normally 
applicable only to international armed conflict. The same could be said of Article 184-
bis of the MPCW, which defines the crime of taking of hostages as applying only 
during international armed conflicts, in contrast to Article 8 (2) (c) (iii) of the Rome 
Statute.34 Furthermore, there is still no domestic provision in the MPCW penalizing 
the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without a previous 
judgment (Article 8 (2) (c) (iv)), the intentional attacks against personnel, 
installations, material, units or vehicles involved in a humanitarian assistance or 
peacekeeping missions in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations (Article 
8 (2) (e) (iii)), and the conscription and enlistment of children under the age of 15 
years into armed forces or using them to participate actively in hostilities (Article 8 
(2) (e) (vii)). 
5. Principles of Criminal Responsibility, Defences and Other Bars to 
Prosecution  
A. General Principles of Criminal Responsibility  
Many general principles of criminal responsibility contained in Part 3 of the Rome 
Statute are already defined in similar terms in Italian legislation. For example, the 
nullum crimen sine lege and nulla pœna sine lege principles (Articles 22 and 23 of the 
Rome Statute) are contained in Article 25 (2) of the Constitution, Article 1 of the 
Penal Code and Article 37 of the MPCP; the principle of the non-retroactivity of 
criminal law (Article 24 of the Rome Statute) in Article 25 (2) of the Constitution and 
Article 2 of the Penal Code; and the principle of the individual character of criminal 
responsibility (Article 25 of the Rome Statute) in Article 27 (1) of the Constitution. 
B. Responsibility of Commanders and Superiors  
On the whole, Article 28 of the Rome Statute could be implemented by the broad 
provision contained in Article 40 (2) of the Italian Penal Code and by the provisions 
on complicity (Articles 110 et seq. of the Penal Code). Article 230 of the MPCW also 
provides for the criminal responsibility of any member of the armed forces who, 
because of fear or other inexcusable reason, does not employ all means to prevent the 
commission of certain crimes. However, Article 230 is narrower than Article 28 of the 
Rome Statute in its being limited only to the commission of certain crimes.35 
C. Defences 
Italian legislation provides for the defences of self-defence (Article 52 of the Penal 
Code and Article 42 of the MPCP), necessity (Article 54 (1) (2) of the Penal Code), 
                                           
34 N. Ronzitti, ‘Una legge organica per l’invio di corpi di spedizione all’estero?’, 85 Rivista di diritto 
internazionale (2002), 139-143, at 142 . 
35 In particular, the crimes set out in Articles 186 (pillage), 187 (arson, destruction and serious damage 
to an enemy state), 192 (ill-treatment of ill, injured or shipwrecked persons), 193 (dispossession of ill, 
injured or shipwrecked persons), 202 (collective rebellion) and 203 (collective indiscipline) of the 
Code. 
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duress (Article 54 (3) of the Penal Code), mental incapacity (Articles 88 and 89 of the 
Penal Code) and intoxication (Articles 91 et seq. of the Penal Code36) under 
conditions similar to those indicated in Article 31 of the Rome Statute, and also 
provides for the defence of physical coercion (Article 46). However, Italian law is 
more restrictive than Article 31 with regard to intoxication, since it provides that 
intoxication cannot be used as a defence when a person has become unintentionally 
intoxicated through his or her own carelessness or negligence (Article 92 (1) of the 
Penal Code). 
Article 42 of the MPCP, which provides for self-defence against existing 
(‘attuale’) and unlawful violence, is narrower than Article 52 of the Penal Code 
(which also envisages the mere threat of an offence being committed as a ground for 
self-defence) and Article 31 (1) (c) of the Rome Statute (which allows for self-defence 
where the use of force is ‘imminent’)37. However, the Italian Constitutional Court has 
interpreted Article 42 of the MPCP as including self-defence in response to the threat 
of an offence being committed.38 Furthermore, under the Rome Statute and the 
MPCP, self-defence can be invoked only against an unlawful use of force, while the 
Penal Code (which employs the more generic word ‘offence’) also provides for self-
defence in the fact of non-violent or passive conduct.39 
Article 47 of the Penal Code provides that the mistake of fact excludes criminal 
responsibility (providing, in some cases, that it is non-negligent), while Article 32 (1) 
of the Rome Statute provides for this defence only if it negates the mental element 
required by the crime. Article 47 (3) is also broader in that, it includes the mistake on 
a law other than criminal law which has caused a mistake of fact as a ground for 
excluding criminal responsibility. The mistake of law does not exclude criminal 
responsibility according to Article 5 of the Penal Code and Article 39 of the MPCP, 
while under Article 32 (2) of the Rome Statute this defence may be invoked when it 
negates the mental element required by the crime or as provided for in Article 33. As 
to the culpa in causa, the Italian Constitutional Court has ruled that Article 5 and 
Article 39 are not consistent with the Constitution where they do not provide for an 
‘unavoidable’ mistake of law as a ground for excluding criminal responsibility, while 
a clause referring to the ‘avoidability’ of the mistake of law, previously included in 
the drafts, was eventually left out in the final text of Article 32 (2).40 Therefore, 
according to the Rome Statute, an avoidable or negligent mistake of law may exclude 
criminal responsibility (providing, of course, that it negates the mental element 
required by the crime), while under Italian law it has to be unavoidable. 
Article 51 of the Italian Penal Code provides that compliance with a lawful 
                                           
36 However, Art. 91 provides that intoxication can be invoked as a defence only if it derives from a 
fortuitous event or force majeure. 
37 As to the object of the threat, it is to be noted that the Penal Code admits self-defence also when 
property is threatened, while according to the MPCP self-defence can be invoked only if the rights to 
life and physical integrity are threatened. Under the Rome Statute, danger to property can be relevant 
for self-defence only with regard to war crimes, when it is essential for the survival of the person or 
another person or for accomplishing a military mission, and according to Art. 2 (2) of the 1950 
European Convention on Human Rights, which Italy has ratified, killing in self defence is lawful only 
to save another life, not property. 
38 Constitutional Court, (3) 11 June 1987, No. 225, 32 Giurisprudenza costituzionale (1987-II), 1703-
1707. See D. Brunelli and G. Mazzi, Diritto penale militare (Milano: Giuffrè, 2002), at 90-91. 
39 F. Antolisei, supra note 4, 300-301. 
40 Constitutional Court 23-24 March 1988, No. 364 (111 Foro italiano (1988), Parte Prima, 1385-
1412), and 24 February 1995, No. 61 (35 Cassazione penale (1995-II), 1754-1761), respectively. The 
mistake is ‘unavoidable’ when it is due to a fortuitous event or force majeure. 
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order or provision relieves from criminal responsibility.41 The person who obeys an 
unlawful order is not responsible if he or she believed, due to a mistake of fact, that 
the order was lawful, or could not challenge the lawfulness of the order. As to the 
second case, however, Article 4 of Law No. 382 of 11 July 1978, which contains the 
principles governing military discipline, states that a subordinate has a duty not to 
carry out an order which is manifestly directed against the institutions of the state or 
which is manifestly unlawful: the latter part of this article seems to be consistent with 
Article 33 of the Rome Statute, but it goes further by expressly imposing a duty to 
disobey manifestly unlawful orders.42 The lawfulness of an order should in any case 
be established in the light of international law, rather than only in the light of national 
legislation, so that an order to carry out genocide, crimes against humanity or war 
crimes could never be a lawful order, even if such conduct were not criminalised 
under national law.43 
D. Other Bars To Prosecution 
1. Immunities 
Article 27 of the Rome Statute recognises the irrelevance of official capacity as far as 
responsibility for crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court is concerned, but 
according to Article 90 of the Italian Constitution the President of the Republic  
cannot be held responsible for his official acts, with the exceptions of an attack on the 
Constitution and high treason.44 An ‘attack on the Constitution’, which is defined 
neither in the Penal Code nor in the Constitution itself, includes any conduct aimed at 
subverting the state institutions or at deliberately violating the Constitution.45 
Furthermore, members of the Parliament cannot be held responsible for the opinions 
expressed and the votes given while carrying out their duties and cannot be prosecuted 
or deprived of their freedom in the absence of the authorization of the Chamber to 
which he or she belongs, unless they have been convicted or have been caught in the 
act of committing a crime for which obligatory arrest in flagrante delicto is provided 
(Article 68 of the Constitution, as amended by Constitutional Law No. 3 of 29 
October 1993).46 Under Article 122 of the Constitution, members of regional councils 
cannot be held responsible for the opinions expressed and the votes given while 
carrying out their duties. Finally, the Prime Minister and ministers can be held 
responsible for crimes committed while carrying out their duties but can be 
prosecuted only upon authorization by the Parliament (Article 96, as amended by 
Constitutional Law No. 1 of 16 January 1989).  
                                           
41 By Law No. 382 of 11 July 1978 (which repealed former Art. 40 of the MPCP), Art. 51 also applies 
to military crimes. 
42 On the notion of ‘manifestly unlawful order’, see Tribunale Militare di Roma, 1 August 1996, in 
Rassegna di giustizia militare, No. 1, 2, 3, January-June 1999, 27 ff. See also Art. 25 of the 
Regolamento di disciplina militare (Presidential Decree No. 545 of 18 July 1986). 
43 Art. 59 of the MPCP, which can also be applied to war crimes under Art. 47 of the MPCW, provides 
that superior orders may constitute a ground for reduction of sentence: however, unlike Art. 27 on the 
irrelevance of official capacity, this possibility is not excluded by Art. 33 of the Rome Statute. 
44 The President of the Republic must be impeached by the absolute majority of the members of the 
Parliament (Art. 90 (2) of the Constitution).  
45 T. Martines, Diritto costituzionale (Milano: Giuffrè, 2003), 293. 
46 A member of the Parliament might for example submit to the Parliament a draft law authorising 
conduct amounting to a crime under international law, such as the use of methods amounting to torture 
during interrogations, or could give a speech inciting racial hatred. 
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As highlighted by the European Commission for Democracy Through Law (the 
‘Venice Commission’), established by the Council of Ministers of the Council of 
Europe, there could be three ways to make a Constitution which provides for 
immunities for state officials consistent with the Rome Statute: making reference to 
customary international law, interpreting national provisions in such a way as to avoid 
conflict with the Statute, and, if all else fails, amending the Constitution.47 As to the 
first argument, it may be that the President of the Republic, Prime Minister, ministers, 
members of Parliament and members of regional councils can be held criminally 
responsible for genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes under Article 10 
(1) of the Constitution, according to which the Italian legal order conforms to the 
generally recognized norms of international law.48 However, this argument is not 
entirely persuasive, because customary international law only provides for the 
irrelevance of functional immunities granted to certain state officials by international 
law in proceedings before foreign or international courts, and not of immunities 
granted by national law before national courts.49 
The apparent contradiction between Article 27 of the Rome Statute and Articles 
68, 90, 96 and 122 of the Italian Constitution might then be solved interpreting them 
in the light of Article 11 of the Constitution, according to which ‘Italy … on 
conditions of parity with other states, agrees to the limitations of sovereignty 
necessary for an order that ensures peace and justice among Nations; promotes and 
encourages international organizations having such ends in view’. Indeed, the 
International Criminal Court can be included among those organizations. The 
Preamble of the Rome Statute provides that grave crimes within the jurisdiction of the 
Court threaten the peace, security and well-being of the world (para. 3) and that the 
aim of the Court is to put an end to impunity for the perpetrators of such crimes, to 
contribute to their prevention and to guarantee lasting respect for and the enforcement 
of international justice (paras. 5 and 11). However, the application of Article 11 has 
always been problematic and referred only to European Community law. 
Finally, it could be maintained that, as far as the President of the Republic is 
concerned, the commission of crimes under the Rome Statute amounts to an attack on 
the Constitution (and in particular on its Articles 2, 10 and 11), for which – as noted 
above - there is no constitutional immunity. 
Be that as it may, it would be more convenient to include a provision having 
constitutional status in the implementing legislation providing that, in cases of crimes 
under the Rome Statute, no official capacity is relevant. Such an amendment would 
ensure that any official could be prosecuted under national law for such crimes or 
surrendered to the Court.  
2. Statutes of Limitation 
Article 29 of the Rome Statute provides for the non-applicability of statutes of 
                                           
47 Venice Commission, Report on Constitutional Issues Raised by the Ratification of the Rome Statute 
of the International Criminal Court, 4 December 2000, available on line at 
http://www.venice.coe.int/docs/2001/CDL-INF(2001)001-e.asp (visited December 2005). 
48 P. Benvenuti, ‘Italy, Implementation of the ICC Statute in National Legislation, Constitutional 
Aspects’, in C. Kreß and F. Lattanzi (eds), The Rome Statute and Domestic Legal Orders. General 
Aspects and Constitutional Issues (Baden Baden: Nomos - Ripa di Fagnano Alto: Sirente, 2000), vol. I, 
123-137, at 134. 
49 P. Gaeta, ‘L’incidenza dello Statuto di Roma sulle norme costituzionali italiane in materia di 
immunità’, 2 Diritto pubblico comparato ed europeo (2000-I), 594-605, at 602. 
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limitation to crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court, but under Article 157 of the 
Italian Penal Code statutes of limitation are inapplicable only when the relevant 
offence would entail life imprisonment.50 However, in Italian law the maximum 
penalty for certain Rome Statute crimes (for example, those included in Article 185-
bis of the MPCW) is not commensurate with the severity of the circumstances under 
which they are committed. Moreover, for certain crimes to be punished by life 
imprisonment it is necessary that aggravating circumstances are deemed to apply and 
that they prevail over extenuating circumstances.51 It may be that the non-applicability 
of statutory limitations to genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes is 
already established in Italy through Article 10 (1) of the Constitution, which gives 
effect to customary international law in the Italian legal order. This has been upheld 
by the Military Court of Rome on 22 July 1997, No. 322 in the Priebke case.52 
6. The Exercise of Jurisdiction by Italian Courts over Those 
Responsible for Genocide, Crimes Against Humanity and War 
Crimes  
According to the Preamble of the Rome Statute, each state has the duty ‘to exercise its 
criminal jurisdiction over those responsible for international crimes’. On the basis of 
the principle of complementarity, failure to do so might result in the exercise of the 
jurisdiction by the Court (Article 17 of the Rome Statute). Italian courts might have 
jurisdiction over crimes under the Rome Statute on the basis of the following 
principles. 
Territorial Jurisdiction. Italian courts have jurisdiction over any crime 
perpetrated in Italian territory, regardless of the nationality of the victim or of the 
perpetrator (Article 6 (1) of the Penal Code).53 
Active Personality Jurisdiction. Article 9 of the Penal Code provides for the 
jurisdiction of Italian courts over Italian nationals who have committed abroad a non-
political crime sanctioned with no less than three years’ imprisonment, if the suspect 
is present in Italy. For minor crimes, the prosecution must be requested by the 
Minister of Justice or by the victim. The request of the Minister of Justice is always 
necessary if the offence has been committed against a foreign state or national, and 
extradition must not have been granted or accepted by the state where the offence was 
committed. Furthermore, Article 604 of the Penal Code (as amended by Law No. 269 
of 3 August 1998) provides for the application of Italian criminal law to some crimes 
(e.g. enslavement, prostitution and pornography involving minors), even when the 
crime has been committed abroad by an Italian, or by a foreigner in complicity with 
an Italian. Finally, according to Article 3 (a) of Law No. 498 of 3 November 1988 on 
the ratification and domestic execution of the UN Convention against Torture, Italian 
courts have jurisdiction over crimes of torture committed abroad by an Italian, but the 
request of the Minister of Justice is necessary. 
                                           
50 Statutory limitations for crimes are addressed in Articles 157 to 161 of the Penal Code. Italy has not 
yet ratified the 1968 United Nations and the 1974 European Conventions on the Non-Applicability of 
Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity. 
51 See, e.g., Art. 575 et seq. of the Penal Code with regard to murder. 
52 The text can be read in 38 Cassazione penale (1998-I), 689-691. 
53 According to Art. 22 of the Lateran Treaty, Italy also has jurisdiction over crimes perpetrated in the 
territory of Vatican City if the author is present in Italy. 
 15
Passive Personality Jurisdiction. Article 10 (1) of the Penal Code provides for 
the Italian jurisdiction over non-political crimes committed abroad by foreigners 
against the Italian state or nationals if the crime is one for which the penalty is no less 
than one year. The perpetrator must be present on Italian territory and the prosecution 
must be requested by the Minister of Justice or by the victim. Article 604 of the Penal 
Code provides that the provisions on enslavement, prostitution and pornography 
involving minors, sexual tourism involving minors, trafficking, sale and purchase of 
slaves, sexual violence, sexual intercourse with minors, corruption of minors also 
apply when such crimes are committed abroad to the detriment of an Italian citizen. 
According to Article 3 (b) of Law No. 498 of 1988, Italian courts have jurisdiction 
over crimes of torture committed by a foreigner abroad against an Italian national, at 
the request of the Minister of Justice. It is also to be noted that the legislation 
authorizing or extending the participation of Italian military personnel to international 
operations in Afghanistan and Iraq contains a provision according to which the 
Tribunal of Rome has jurisdiction over crimes committed by a foreigner in 
Afghanistan or Iraq against the Italian state or an Italian national participating in the 
mission, at the request of the Minister of Justice, after consultation with the Minister 
of Defence if the victim is a member of the armed forces.54 
Protective Jurisdiction. Article 8 of the Penal Code provides for protective 
jurisdiction over ‘political crimes’.55 As used in Article 8, this term can be interpreted 
in a way which would include crimes under international law. Indeed, according to the 
jurisprudence, Article 8 must be read in the light of Article 10 (1) of the Constitution 
and of the international conventions protecting human rights, relying on a broader 
concept of state political interest which includes the protection of the rights of the 
citizens.56 The Minister of Justice must however authorize a prosecution based on 
Article 8 and, in some cases, prosecution must be requested by the victim. 
Article 13 of the MPCW also establishes the jurisdiction of Italian courts over 
certain  crimes committed by members of the enemy armed forces against Italy or an 
allied state or its nationals.57 
 
Universal Jurisdiction. Article 10 (2) of the Penal Code expressly provides for 
                                           
54 Art. 16 of d.l. No. 165 of 10 July 2003 (enacted by Law No. 219 of 1 August 2003) and Art. 12 of 
Law No. 231 of 11 August 2003; Art. 12 of d.l. No. 9 of 20 January 2004 (enacted by Law No. 68 of 
12 March 2004); Art. 10 of d.l. No. 160 of 24 June 2004 (enacted by Law No. 207 of 30 July 2004) and 
Art. 7 of Law No. 208 of 30 July 2004; Art. 13 of d.l. No. 3 of 19 January 2005 (enacted by Law No. 
37 of 18 March 2005) and Art. 9 of Law No. 39 of 21 March 2005; Art. 11 of d.l. No. 111 of 28 June 
2005 (enacted by Law No. 157 of 31 July 2005) and Art. 9 of d.l. No. 112 of 28 June 2005 (enacted by 
Law No. 158 of 31 July 2005).  
55 Art. 8 (3) of the Penal Code provides that a political crime is any crime which offends a political 
interest of the state, or a political right of citizens. An ordinary crime which is wholly or partly driven 
by political reasons is also regarded as a political crime. On the concept of ‘political crime’ in the Penal 
Code, see G. Fiandaca and E. Musco, Diritto penale, Parte generale (Bologna: Zanichelli, 2004), 121-
122. 
56 See the decision of the Corte d’Assise d’Appello of Rome of 17 March 2003 in the trial against some 
Argentine military officers charged with crimes committed against Italian citizens during the military 
regime, as confirmed by the Court of Cassation (Cassazione penale (Sez. I), 17 May 2004, No. 23181, 
245 Rivista penale (2004), 829-832). According to both Courts, such crimes were undeniably political 
crimes under Art. 8, being clear that their motivations were political and that the Italian state had a 
political interest to repress actions in violation of the fundamental rights of its citizens.  
57 For crimes committed against Italy in Afghanistan and Iraq by a foreigner, see the above discussion 
on the passive personality principle.  
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custodial universal jurisdiction over non-political crimes committed abroad by 
foreigners against foreigners or the European Communities or foreign states if the 
crime is one for which the penalty is no less than three years. However, the 
prosecution must be requested by the Minister of Justice and the perpetrator must be 
present on Italian territory. In addition, extradition must not have been granted or 
accepted by the territorial state or the state of the perpetrator’s nationality. 
Article 3 (2) of the Penal Code provides that Italian criminal law is binding on 
every citizen or foreigner who is abroad when provided by Italian or international law, 
and according to Article 7 (5) Italian courts have jurisdiction over a foreign national 
for crimes committed abroad when there is a specific law or treaty which establishes 
the applicability of Italian criminal law (such as the Geneva Conventions and 
Additional Protocol I (but only for ‘grave breaches’) and the Convention against 
Torture). In this case, there is no requirement that the perpetrator be present in the 
territory at the time an investigation is opened and he or she may be tried in absentia. 
However, it is not entirely clear to what extent Italian courts can exercise universal 
jurisdiction under Article 7 (5), since, according to some commentators, this provision 
cannot be applied directly and courts may apply the jurisdictional provisions of a 
treaty only when they have been transposed into Italian law. Furthermore, the 
reference to ‘international treaties [which] establish that Italian criminal law shall 
apply’ prevents Italy from exercising universal jurisdiction over genocide,58 crimes 
against humanity and war crimes that are not grave breaches of the Geneva 
Conventions and of Protocol I;59 over crimes under international law over which 
universal jurisdiction is established only under customary law; and over those crimes 
that are not prohibited by a treaty. 
Norms contained in other Codes which might also be relevant are Articles 17 
and 18 of the MPCP, which provide for a limited universal jurisdiction over crimes 
committed abroad by those submitted to military penal law, and Article 3 (c) of the 
above mentioned Law No. 498 of 1988, which provides that Italian courts have 
jurisdiction over crimes amounting to torture under Article 1 of the Convention even 
when committed abroad by a foreigner, provided that the accused is present in Italy 
and extradition has not been granted. The request of the Minister of Justice is 
necessary. However, in the absence of a domestic provision which defines the crime 
of torture in domestic law, the tribunal should apply norms on ordinary crimes and 
therefore should deny its universal jurisdiction as established by Law No. 498.60 
7. Concluding Remarks 
It is a matter of concern that Italy, which played a leading role in the establishment of 
the International Criminal Court, has not yet enacted effective implementing 
legislation for the Rome Statute. It can be maintained that Italy’s obligation to fully 
                                           
58 The 1948 Genocide Convention does not provide for universal jurisdiction for this crime (W. 
Schabas, Genocide in International Law (Cambridge: CUP, 2000), 367). See, contra, S. Zappalà, 
‘Droit italien’, in A. Cassese and M. Delmas-Marty (eds), Juridictions nationales et crimes 
internationaux (Paris: PUF, 2002), 193-215, at 203, according to whom Art. 7 (5) refers not only to 
international conventions but also to specific laws, including the Italian law that has implemented the 
Genocide Convention in Italy (the above mentioned Law no. 962 of 1967). Such law does not make 
any distinction on the basis of the nationality of the victim or of the perpetrator or on the locus 
commissi delicti. 
59 Art. 49 of the I Geneva Convention; Art. 50 of the II Geneva Convention; Art. 129 of the III Geneva 
Convention; Art. 146 of the IV Geneva Convention; Art. 86 (1) of Additional Protocol I. 
60 A. Marchesi, supra note 23, at 473. 
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implement the Statute derives from the new text of Article 117 (1) of the Italian 
Constitution. However, Italy’s failure to adopt such legislation would also imply its 
international responsibility. In the case of cooperation obligations and offences 
against the administration of justice, the obligation is expressly provided in the Rome 
Statute. For certain crimes (genocide, torture), the obligation derives from jus cogens, 
as stated by the ICTY. In the other cases, the obligation to ensure that crimes under 
the jurisdiction of the Court are also crimes under national law and that domestic 
principles of criminal responsibility, defences and other bars to prosecution are 
consistent with those contained in the Rome Statute is implicit in the Statute itself, 
because the jurisdiction of the Court is based on the principle of complementarity.  
This article has demonstrated that there are many inconsistencies between the 
Italian legislation and the Rome Statute. In particular, many crimes within the 
jurisdiction of the Court are still omitted from Italian law while others are defined 
more narrowly, especially when conduct amounting to an international crime is 
classified as an ordinary offence in domestic law. Principles of criminal responsibility 
and defences are also not always consistent with those embodied in the Rome Statute, 
and immunities and statutes of limitation might be invoked to bar the prosecution of 
those accused of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. The extent of the 
universal jurisdiction of Italian courts over such  crimes is also dubious. For these 
reasons, implementing legislation should be enacted as soon as possible, if Italy does 
not want to become a safe haven for persons accused of the worst crimes known to 
humanity. 
